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TORTS - UNFAIR COMPETITION - BAKERY ROUTE CONSIDERED
"GoomiLL," THEREFORE HELD NOT THE PROPER SUBJECT OF
ACTION IN CONVERSION.-Plaintiff's testator was the owner of a

bakery. Plaintiff's complaint alleged that defendant had unlawfully
converted testator's bakery route to its own use. The Supreme Court
dismissed the complaint, and held, a door to door bakery route consists solely of goodwill, and as such, it is intangible and thus not
the proper subject of an action in conversion. Stern v. Kaufman's
Bakery, Inc., - Misc.2d -, 191 N.Y.S.2d 734 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
Mr. Justice Cardozo in referring to the goodwill of a business '
stated: "Men will pay for any privilege that gives a reasonable
expectancy of preference in the race of competition." 2 In an age
that places such meticulous concern on methods of "selling the public"
there can be little doubt that men will pay a high price to acquire
this "privilege" referred to by the famous jurist. The goodwill of
an established business is probably its primary asset. 3
4
Goodwill, which usually includes trade names within its scope,
was apparently acknowledged as a valuable intangible worthy of
judicial protection as early as the 16th century.6 Today it is a well
accepted property right,6 widely recognized by the courts,7 andl the
subject of much discussion.8
In New York the business man may validly transfer this intangible property right either upon his death 9 or during his lifetime 10

' See also Mr. Justice Story's sweeping definition of goodwill, Wright,
Tort Responsibility for Destruction of Goodwill, 14 CORNELL L.Q. 298, 300
n.15 (1929).
2Matter of Brown, 242 N.Y. 1, 6, 150 N.E. 581, 582 (1929).
3 See Mitchell, Unfair Competition, 10 HAv. L. REv. 275, 280 (1896).
4Dairymen's League Co-op Ass'n v. Weckerle, 160 Misc. 866, 874, 291
N.Y. Supp. 704, 710-11 (Sup. Ct. 1936).
GWright, supra note 1, at 298.
In 1851 a New York court granted an injunction against a defendant
who was trying to adopt the same name for his hotel as that used by the
plaintiff. The court stated that it was protecting "some portion of the fruits
of that good will which honestly belong to him [plaintiff] alone." Howard
v. Henriques, 5 N.Y. Super. Ct. Rep. 725, 726 (1851).
6 See 17 GEo. L.J. 67, 70 (1928); Mitchell, note 3 supra.
7As early as 1837 an English judge stated: "The good will of a trade
is a subject of value and price. It may be sold, bequeathed, or become assets
in the hands of the personal representative of a trader." (per Tindal, C.J.,
in Hitchcock v. Coker, 6 Ad. & E. 438, 454, 112 Eng. Rep. 167, 174 (Ex. 1837) ).
8 For a discussion of the various aspects of goodwill and a full citation
of authorities, see Note, An Inquiry into te Nature of Goodwill, 53 CoLum.
L. Rzv. 660 (1953).
9 "The testator's gift to his son of 'the store, with all its furnishings,
fixtures,' included the testator's jewelry business conducted in the specified
store and its stock in trade and good will, together with the right to occupy
the premises." In re Keehn's Will, 156 Misc. 259, 264, 281 N.Y. Supp. 591,
596 (Surr. Ct.), aff'd mer., 248 App. Div. 697, 298 N.Y. Supp. 819 (1st Dep't
1936 ; see also Matter of Ulrici, 111 Misc. 55, 182 N.Y. Supp. 517 (Surr. Ct.
19 20 St.9
See Wood v. Whitehead Brothers Co., 165 N.Y. 545, 59 N.E. 357 (1901);
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when it has been acquired as a result of more or less impersonal
elements such as "reasonable prices, good quality of merchandise and
fair dealing." 11 However, goodwill which is solely attributed to
personal and professional skill, as that of a doctor, lawyer or accountant, terminates upon 2 the death of such person and is not considered part of his estate.1
The question in the present case was whether the goodwill 13
of a bakery route is the proper subject of a conversion.
A conversion is considered "an act of wilful interference, without
lawful justification, with any chattel 14 in a manner inconsistent with
the right of another, whereby that other is deprived of the use and
possession of it." 15 This tort was born out of the old common-law
action of trover,16 which in turn was based upon a fiction.' 7 Today

Shubert v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 189 Misc. 734, 72 N.Y.S.2d 851 (Sup.
Ct. 1947). The sale of goodwill as part of a business was apparently first
recognized in 1620 by the English courts. Wright, supra, note 1.
11 Bailey v. Betti, 241 N.Y. 22, 26, 148 N.E. 776, 777 (1925).
12 Matter of Leserman, 145 Misc. 387, 260 N.Y. Supp. 188 (Surr. Ct. 1932).
See In re Bluestein's Will, 197 Misc. 616, 95 N.Y.S.2d 874 (Surr. Ct. 1950).
However, there is dicta in New York which appears to recognize the
right of a professional man to transfer the goodwill of his business during
his lifetime. See Matter of Caldwell, 107 Misc. 316, 319-21, 176 N.Y. Supp.
425, 427 (Surr. Ct. 1919).
13 It should be noted that the goodwill in the present case was probably
inherited as part of a business as in, In re Keehn's Will, supra note 9.
14 A chattel is "an article of personal property; any species of property
not amounting to a freehold or fee in land." BLAcK, LAw DICTIONARY 316
(3d ed. 1933).
Since the goodwill of a business is a well recognized property right it
might well be included within the scope of Black's definition.
Some courts have used the word property in place of chattel when defining conversion. Coleman v. Francis, 102 Conn. 612, 129 Atl. 718, 719
(1925) ; People's State Savings Bank v. Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co., 158 Mo.
App. 519, 138 S.W. 915, 917 (1911).
A New York court defined conversion as "any distinct act of dominion
wrongfully exerted over another's personal property in denial of or inconsistent with his [the owner's] rights therein." Meyer v. Price, 250 N.Y. 370,
381, 165 N.E. 814, 819 (1929).
15 SALMOND, TORTS 323 (11th ed. 1953).
16 Id. at 316-17;
Warren, Qualifying as Plaintiff in an Action for a
Conversion, 49 HARv. L. RFv. 1084, 1085 (1936).
17 "The classic count in trover alleges that the plaintiff was possessed, as
of his own property, of a certain chattel; that he afterwards casually lost it;
that it came to the possession of the defendant by finding; that the defendant
refused to deliver it to the plaintiff on request; and that he converted it to
his own use, to the plaintiff's damage." Ames, The History of Trover,
11 HARv. L. Rnv. 277 (1897).
"The fictitious allegations survived . . . even into our own century, in

jurisdictions where the lost art of common law pleading lingered on; and
there are quite modern cases in which it was alleged that the plaintiff casually
lost, and the defendant found, something like a steamboat or twenty carloads
of grain." Prosser, The Nature of Conversion, 42 CORNEi.L L.Q. 168, 170
(1957).
However, "trover has had its long day," and in the usual case today the
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conversion includes within its scope situations which had previously
been covered by trespass and detinue,18 and it has become "a more
or less universal remedy applicable to all cases in which a plaintiff
has been deprived of his goods, whether by a wrongful taking, a
wrongful detention, or some wrongful disposal." 'o
During the early history of the common law it was supposed
that there could not be a conversion of intangible property.2 0 This,
however, is not the true state of the law today.21 In recognition of
the significant role which credit plays in our present economic structure, the courts have extended conversion to include within its scope
many choses in action,22 which might be considered tangible evidence
indiof intangible property rights.23 The courts of New York have
2 7
and a
cated that stocks, 24 bonds, 25 checks, 26 a promissory note
draft 2 8 are all proper subjects of conversion.
Does this extension of conversion to include intangible property
rights bring goodwill within its sweep?
The question is answered in the negative. "An action in the

plaintiff brings his action in tort for conversion rather than trover. Warren,
supra note 16.
IsPRossER, ToRTs 66 (2d ed. 1955).
1l Id. at 67.
In addition to showing a wrongful interference with the property, the
plaintiff must also evidence that he had possession or the right to possession
of the property in order to recover in conversion. McCoy v. American Express
Co., 253 N.Y. 477, 481, 171 N.E. 749, 752, reargutnent denied, 254 N.Y. 550,
173 N.E. 861 (1930). But see Warren, supra note 16, at 1100-09.
20 "Another ancient restriction, based on the fiction of losing and finding,
was that trover would not lie for intangible property, because it could not
PRossR, mupra note 18, at 69. See Comment, 10 FoRDHAM
be 'found.'"
L. REv. 415 (1941).
21 See PRossER, op. cit. supra note 18, at 69-70.
See Ayers v. French, 41
Conn. 142, 151 (1874).
22 Comment, note 20 mtpra.
23 Whether conversion will lie only for choses in action which are evidenced by tangible property is seriously questioned. Ibid. The author states
that, "the upholding of actions for conversion of shares of stock not yet
issued, for debts, causes of action and perhaps for ideas when unlawfully
appropriated (all without any tangible writing to represent the choses in
action) has reached the stage where it is no longer entirely a series of exceptions to a general rule." Id. at 431.
Dean Prosser points out that "there may be an action for conversion,
not only of the intangible rights represented by special instruments .. .but
also of such rights alone, as in the case of the corporate stock apart from
the certificate." PRossER, TORTS 69-70 (2d ed. 1955).
24 Pierpoint v. Hoyt, 260 N.Y. 26, 182 N.E. 235 (1932); Travis v. Knox
Terpezone Co., 215 N.Y. 259, 109 N.E. 250 (1915).
20 See Chester County v. Guarantee Trust and Safe Deposit Co., 165 App.
Div. 329, 150 N.Y. Supp. 1010 (1st Dep't 1914).
26 Schmidt v. Garfield Nat'l Bank, 64 Hun 298, 19 N.Y. Supp. 252 (Sup.
Ct. 1892).
27 Griggs v. Day, 136 N.Y. 152, 32 N.E. 612 (1892).
28
Lawatsch v. Cooney, 86 Hun 546, 33 N.Y. Supp. 775 (Sup. Ct. 1895).
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nature of trover lies only 29 for the conversion of tangible personal
property, or tangible evidence of title to intangible or real property," 30
which does not include goodwill since it is neither tangible property
nor tangible evidence of intangible
property. This seems to sum up
81
the general view of the courts.
In Taft v. Smith, Gray & Co., 32 the plaintiff, a former clothing
salesman for the defendant, brought an action for conversion of a
book which contained a list of customers compiled by the plaintiff
during a period of about twenty years. The court, acknowledging
the fact that the book had no market or other probable value, sustained a verdict of $500 for the plaintiff on the basis that his earning
power was increased by the use of the book. It would appear that
the court's reference to earning power was merely a reference to the
goodwill of certain customers which the plaintiff had acquired over
a period of years. The court stated:
The author or compiler of a manuscript has a property right in it. This
property right attaches not only to the physical or corporeal substance which
composes the manuscript but includes the incorporeal right to the exclusive
use of its contents ...
The book contained the names of those who entertained a kind of good-will
to the plaintiff. ....33

Although it was the book itself which was the subject of the
conversion, the plaintiff's damages were estimated solely in terms of
customer goodwill which might have materialized into clothing sales
commissions.
Thus, the authority in New York3 4 which includes the Taft
case appears to indicate that even though goodwill is not the proper
subject of a conversion, it may be the sole basis for damages in such
an action.
The refusal of the courts to include goodwill within conversion's
scope seems justified. Not only has the value of goodwill "taxed
the best minds of the legal and accounting professions," 35 but the
vagueness and flexibility of this intangible property right is by its
very nature outside the realm of conversion.
29 See note 23 mtpra, wherein two references are mentioned which seem to
indicate that the word only should be removed from this general rule.
30 Stern v. Kaufman's Bakery, Inc., - Misc.2d -, 191 N.Y.S.2d 734, 735
(Sup. Ct. 1959).
3' See, e.g., Meier v. Wilkens, 15 App. Div. 97, 44 N.Y. Supp. 274 (2d Dep't
1897); Stern v. Kaufman's Bakery, Inc., note 30 supra; Roystone v. John H.
Woodbury Dermatological Institute, 67 Misc. 265, 122 N.Y. Supp. 144 (Sup.
Ct. 1910) ; Illinois Minerals Co. v. McCarty, 318 Ill. App. 423, 48 N.E.2d 424,
427 (1943); Olschewski v. Hudson, 87 Cal. App. 282, 262 Pac. 43, 45-46
(1927).
See also PRossER, TORTS 70 (2d ed. 1955); Comment, 10 FORDHAM
L. REv. 415, 425-26 (1941).
32 76 Misc. 283, 134 N.Y. Supp. 1011 (Sup. Ct. 1912).
33
Id. at 286-87, 134 N.Y. Supp. at 1013-14.
34 See New York cases cited in note 31 supra.
35 Comment, supra note 31, at 425.
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The usual damages in a conversion action are measured by the
market value of the property converted, 36 which in effect is a forced
sale. In order "to force" such a sale upon a defendant, it should be
determined that he has actually converted the plaintiff's property.
But who can ascertain just how much customer goodwill the defendant has brought within his control and how much still remains
with the plaintiff? If goodwill means that "the old customers will
resort to the old place," 37 isn't it more likely that the plaintiff's
business rather than the defendant's is still the "old place," especially
since the conversion action must be instituted within three years
from the time of the actual conversion.3 8 For that matter, who can
establish when the actual conversion took place,3 9 and whether and
how long the "converted" customer will continue dealing with the
"'converter"? The answers to such questions are of such a speculative nature
that they apparently cannot be justly determined by the
40
courts.
Since the businessman does not have a remedy in conversion
for the wrongful interference with his customer goodwill, is he to
be left completely at the mercy of his shrewd competitors?
In the interest of the public and the competitors themselves 41
-the courts of equity have provided relief in certain cases where a
rival business has been guilty of what is nebulously termed "unfair
competition." 42 This relief may be granted in the form of an in3GSee Faust, Distinction Between Conversion and Trespass to Chattel,
.37 OR. L. REv. 256 (1958); Prosser, The Nature of Conversion, 42 Copiuu.
L.Q. 168, 184 (1957).
37Lord Eldon's definition of goodwill expressed in Cruttwell v. Lye, 17
Ves. Jun. 335, 346, 34 Eng. Rep. 129, 134 (Ch. 1810).
38 N.Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT § 49(5), (7).
39 Has the customer been "converted" as soon as he makes one purchase
from the defendant, or must he make many purchases? Suppose the customer
is dealing with both the defendant and plaintiff. In such a case has the plaintiff's customer goodwill been partially converted? Is not this partial conversion a subject of great flux as the customer either increases or decreases
his dealings with the defendant?
40 But see PRossER, TORTS 70 (2d ed. 1955) : "There is perhaps no essential reason why there might not be a conversion of . . . the good will of a
business.....
Ibid.
41
"[T]he question of what is unfair competition in business must be determined with particular reference to the character and circumstances of the
business. The question . . . is not so much the rights of either party as
against the public but their rights as between themselves." International
News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 236 (1918) ; W. Walley, Inc.
v. Saks & Co., 266 App. Div. 193, 198, 41 N.Y.S.2d 739, 744 (1st Dep't
1943).
42 "What shall constitute unfair competition tomorrow cannot be clearly
-determined by what has been declared unfair competition today or yesterday.
Even as there are no bounds to human invention when it comes to disposing
-of a product, so too there can be no arbitrary rules of thumb of inclusion or
exclusion as to constituents of unfair competition.... Thus one finds in the
field of unfair competition a welter of legal concepts borrowed from tort law,
property law, etc., by which the courts have justified in judicial robes their
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junction, an accounting, and/or money damages. 43 The many practices which
constitute unfair competition are beyond the scope of this
44
article.
The problem facing the courts in each specific case in this area
of competition is to determine exactly what constitutes an unfair
business practice. 45 This must be done in light of the traditional
American notion of free enterprise 46 without placing unnecessary
stress upon restraint of trade at the expense of fair competition.
The modern attitude is clearly expressed in a recent New York
case: 47

[P]roperty rights of commercial value [in which goodwill is certainly included]
are to be and will be protected from any form of unfair invasion or infringement and from any form of commercial immorality, and a court of48equity
will penetrate and restrain every guise resorted to by the wrongdoer.
Whether the defendant in the present case has been guilty of
unfair competition, which would warrant relief, is unascertainable on

conclusions on purely factual situations." Sadtler, Unfair Competition-Past
and Present Trends, 16 TENN. L. REv. 400 (1940). See Grismore, Are Unfair
Methods of Competition Actionable at the Suit of a Competitor?, 33 MIcH. L.
REv. 321, 323 (1935).
43 Winfred Warren, Inc. v. Turner Gowns, Ltd., 285 N.Y. 62, 32 N.E.2d

793 (1941) (an accounting was granted); People's Coat, Apron and Towel
Supply Co. v. Light, 171 App. Div. 671, 157 N.Y. Supp. 15 (2d Dep't), aff'd,
224 N.Y. 727, 121 N.E. 886 (1918) (an injunction was granted); W. Walley,
Inc. v. Saks & Co., 266 App. Div. 193, 41 N.Y.S.2d 739 (1st Dep't 1943) (an
injunction and accounting were granted).
In some cases an injunction, an accounting, and damages are asked for.
See Dior v. Milton, 9 Misc.2d 425, 155 N.Y.S.2d 443, aff'd, 2 App. Div.2d 878,

156 N.Y.S2d 996 (Sup. Ct. 1956).
44 "These practices are a full subject for a treatise in themselves ...
Included in the list are defamation of the competitor, disparagement of his
goods and his business methods, intimidation, harassing and annoyance of his

customers or his employees, obstruction of the means of access to his place
of business, threats of groundless suits, commercial bribery, and inducing
employees to commit sabotage . . . using trade secrets

. .

. imitation of the

plaintiff's trade mark or trade name, his wrappers, labels or containers, his
vehicles, the badges or uniforms of his employees or the appearance of his
place of business . . . ." PROSSER, TORTS 751-53 (2d ed. 1955).
45 See note 42 supra.
46 "[F] or seven centuries English speaking peoples have struggled to keep
the market free. . . . [T]here has thus come about a fundamental change in
the relationship of government to business. A policy of fostered and protected
monopoly after a trial of five centuries was discarded and the opposite extreme, a policy of wholly unrestricted competition, was for a time adopted.
The unhappy effects of that policy within less than a century resulted in the
adoption of a compromise-a policy of government regulation designed to
maintain a status of free and fair competition protecting alike against the
dangers of monopoly and the evils of uncurbed competition." Jones, Historical
Development of the Law of Business Competition, 36 YALE L.J. 351, 382-83

(1926).

47 Dior v. Milton, supra
48

note 43.

9 Misc.2d at 434, 155 N.Y.S.2d at 455.
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the basis of the plaintiff's complaint.49 However, it may be safely
stated that the mere solicitation of the plaintiff's customers by the
defendant bakery, without an agreement to the contrary, will not"
and should not51 warrant judicial intervention. However, should
the defendant's conduct evidence "deceit, fraud, or abuse of confidence" 52 the plaintiff might very well receive judicial redress.53
"The trader has not a free lance. He may fight but as a soldier,
not as a guerilla." " Business ethics need not unduly suffer at the
hands of a distorted rugged individualism.

49 The complaint (at least on the basis of the reported opinion) merely
stated that the defendant wrongfully and unlawfully converted plaintiff's
testator's bakery route. Exactly what plaintiff contends is wrongful and unlawful is not stated.
50 "There is no clear evidence of deceit, fraud, or abuse of confidence by
the defendant [competitor]. No trade secrets are involved. Plaintiff had no
vested right to the patronage of its customers, and it may well be that its
former customers, from whim, caprice or the winning qualities of the defendant, had transferred their business liking to him. . . . Mere solicitation
does not constitute unfair competition in the absence of an express agreement
to the contrary."
Standard Library, Inc. v. Addis, 167 Misc. 469, 471,
3 N.Y.S.2d 488, 490 (Sup. Ct. 1938). Accord, Apollo Stationery Co. v.
Pilmar, 15 Misc.2d 91, 93, 182 N.Y.S.2d 637, 640 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
51"[Clompetition is the life of trade." People v. Sheldon, 139 N.Y. 251,
263, 34 N.E. 785, 789 (1893).
Professor Chafee points out one of the earliest cases in which an action
in the nature of unfair competition was broughit: "In 1410, the masters of a
long-established grammar school in the cathedral town of Gloucester were
annoyed because an interloper had started a rival school in town." The old
masters brought an action against the newcomer charging that their tuition
had been affected. Held for defendant: "Judge Hill declared the defendant's
conduct was 'a virtuous and charitable thing, and an ease to the people.'
Judge Haneford said, 'It would be against reason for a master to be hindered
from keeping a school where he pleases.'"
Chafee, Untfair Competition,
53 HAgv. L. REv. 1289 (1940).
52 See note 50 supra.
53 See People's Coat, Apron & Towel Supply Co. v. Light, 171 App. Div.
671, 157 N.Y. Supp. 15 (2d Dep't 1916), aff'd, 224 N.Y. 727, 121 N.E. 886

(1918).
54

artell v. White, 185 Mass. 255, 69 N.E. 1085, 1087 (1904).

